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Women's Rights and the Proposed Family
Protection Act
KAREN FLAX*

In this article, the author examines the potential ramifications of the Family ProtectionAct, a bill recently introducedin
the Senate by Senators Jespen and Laxalt. The author criticizes the bill both as a mechanism for legislatively enforcing
the traditional role of women in American society and as a
threat to civil liberties in general.
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The present political climate in Washington threatens the women's rights movement in ways ranging from the defeat of the
Equal Rights Amendment to the elimination of affirmative action
programs. A commitment to what are called "traditional family
values" is central to this conservative attitude. Many conservatives
see the women's rights movement as a special threat to these values because the movement seeks to give women the right to assume roles other than those they have historically occupied, such
as their roles in the traditional family. The purpose of this article
is to show how a specific piece of proposed legislation, the Family
Protection Act of 1981,1 threatens not only the specific rights of
women, but also the very foundations of the women's rights movement. Although external to its central concerns, this article will
conclude by suggesting how the Family Protection Act jeopardizes
civil liberties beyond the immediate area of women's rights.
* B.A., New College; J.D. candidate, University of Miami School of Law.
1. S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127

CONG.

REC. S6324 (daily ed. June 17, 1981).
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BACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT

On June 17, 1981, Iowa's Senator Roger Jespen and Nevada's
Senator Paul Laxalt introduced the Family Protection Act (FPA)
in the United States Senate. As Senator Jepsen remarked, "The
purpose of the act is to preserve the integrity of the American family, to foster and protect the viability of the American family by
emphasizing family responsibilities in education, tax assistance, religion and other areas related to the family and to promote the
virtues of the family."2 The opening section of the bill announces
both a legislative finding that "certain Government policies have
directly or benignly undermined and diminished the viability of
the American family," and a legislative intent that henceforth
"the policy of the Government of the United States should.

. .

be

directed and limited to the strengthening of the American family
and to changing or eliminating any Federal governmental policy
which diminishes
the strength and prosperity of the American
'4
family."

According to its sponsors, a primary aim of the bill is "to restore the responsibilities for strengthening the family to the unit
itself" in areas such as education, religion, and domestic relations.'
Thus, sections of the bill, beyond the scope of this article, contain
provisions for tuition tax credits for parents who send their children to parochial and other private schools.6
In addition to the perpetuation of "family values," a secondary aim of the FPA is to strengthen the rights of states by providing for "[a] shift in responsibility from the Federal Government to
the State and local government."'7 Thus, sections of the Act would
allow states to suspend school attendance requirements and
teacher certification without federal interference. 8 Other sections
2. Id.
3. S. 1378, § 2(b)(3), 127 CONG. REC. at S6329.
4. Id. § 2(b)(4), 127 CONG. REC. at S6329.
5. 127 CONG. REC. at S6328.
6. S. 1378, § 201, 127 CONG. REC. at S6330-32 (proposed I.R.C. § 221(a)-(e)). Tuition
credits have long been high on the conservative political agenda. Their availability would
put the choice of public or private schools within the reach of many who presently cannot
afford the latter.
7. 127 CONG. REC. at S6328.
8. S. 1378, § 302(a)(1)-(2), 127 CONG. REC. at S6334-35. These sections provide that:
Federal funds shall not be withheld under any provision of Federal law nor shall
any provision of Federal law be construed to prohibit(1) the right of any State or any State or local educational agency to determine the qualifications required of teachers within the jurisdictions of such
agencies, including the right to make a determination that no certification re-
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would prevent federal agencies from defining spouse abuse9 and
child abuse"0 more broadly than they are defined by state laws.
Despite these provisions, other features of the FPA would offend a
traditional understanding of states' rights, causing doubt as to
whether the sponsors have a genuine interest in strengthening
states' rights. Paradoxically, although ostensible states' righters,
the FPA's sponsors are calling for a new national policy in behalf
of family values-a national policy in family relations, education,
and other areas traditionally left to state control.1 Senator Laxalt
calls the proposed Act no less than
an integral part of a process to develop a new awareness of the
importance of the family to American society and to develop
Federal policies designed to foster and encourage that family ....

In essence today we are not merely reintroducing a

Family Protection Act but we are reaffirming a family protection
movement."2
As one might expect from this new assertion of federal power,
several provisions of the FPA seek to defeat state efforts to view
family values and supporting educational structures from a different perspective. Thus, the bill requires the withdrawal of federal
funds from any state program that provides contraceptive or abortion services or information to unwed minors without prior parental notification,'" or from any entity engaged in "advocating, promoting, or suggesting homosexuality, male or female, as a life
style."' 4 Moreover, the bill mandates the withdrawal of federal
funds from any agency that excludes parents or unspecified "representatives of the community"'15 from participation in curriculum
quirement will be imposed;
(2) the right of any State to set or refuse to set attendance requirements at
public or private schools within their jurisdictions, including the right to determine that no such attendance requirement will be imposed.
9. Id. § 105, 127 CONG. REC. at S6330. This section provides, "No Federal law, program,
guideline, agency action, commission action, ,directive, or grant shall be construed to abrogate, alter, broaden, or supercede existing State statutory law relating to spousal abuse or
domestic relations."
10. Id. § 104, 127 CONG. REC. at S6329. Subsection (a) provides, "No Federal program,
guideline, agency action, commission action, directive, or grant shall be construed to abrogate, alter, broaden, or supercede existing State statutory law relating to child abuse."
11. S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 73-75 (1982).
12. 127 CONG. REC. at 6344.

13. S. 1378, § 102(a)-(b), 127 CONG. REc. at S6329 (proposed General Education Provisions Act § 440A; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1233h (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); see infra text accompanying notes 25-72.
14. S. 1378, § 108, 127 CONG. REc. at S6330.
15. Id. § 301(a), 127 CONG. REC. at S6334 (proposed General Education Provisions Act
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decisions relating to the study of religion, 16 requires union membership of teachers, 17 or prohibits "parental review of textbooks
prior to their use in public school classrooms."' 8 These provisions
follow the practice of conditioning federal grants-in-aid on state
acceptance of national policy, a practice traditionally resented by
conservatives as indirect violations of states' rights.1 9 The FPA also
employs this practice in a provision that prohibits the use of federal funds for the purchase of educational materials that "do not
reflect a balance between the status role of men and women...
[and] the different ways in which women and men live and do not
contribute to the American way of life as it has been historically
understood. 20 In addition, the bill gives "any individual aggrieved
by a violation of" section 301(a) of the FPA, a cause of action in
federal court "for damages, or for such equitable relief as may be
appropriate, or both,"2' with such costs and attorney's fees as the
courts choose to award. 2 This last provision should be particularly
offensive to those who espouse the pure states' rights view, in light
of the conservative attacks since the Warren Court era on the use
of the equity powers of federal courts to promulgate sweeping and
detailed rules for the operation of schools, prisons, and other institutions exercising public functions.2" A federal judge who wishes to
use this kind of judicial rulemaking to manipulate uncooperative
state and local agencies would have clear authority to do so under
the FPA.' A legislative proposal with these provisions is hardly a
genuine move to return power to the states. Forsaking the institutional tenets of traditional constitutional conservatives, the FPA
freely uses the tools of constitutional liberals to pursue its aim-a
particular idealization of "the American family."
§ 440B(1)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (proposed General Education Provisions Act § 440B(3)).
18. Id. (proposed General Education Provisions Act § 440B(4)); see infra text accompanying notes 115-21.
19. See generally Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126,
2150 & n.12 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Rehnquist, J.); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 & n.17 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.).

20. S. 1378, § 301(b), 127 CONG. REC. at S6334 (proposed General Education Provisions
Act § 440C); see infra text accompanying notes 72-107.

21. S. 1378, § 301(c)(1), 127 CONG. REc. at S6334.
22. Id. § 301(c)(4).
23. See generally G. McDoWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT,
EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982).

24. S.

BARBER,

supra note 11, at 75.
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II.

THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT AND THE ABRIDGEMENT OF
SPECIFIC RIGHTS OF WOMEN

Section 102(a) of the FPA would seriously erode the constitutional rights of women to abortions and to the use of contraceptives or to advice about their use. This section provides that
[n]o program, project, or entity shall receive Federal funds, either directly or indirectly, under any provision of law unless
such program, project, or entity, prior to providing any contraceptive device or abortion service (including abortion counseling) to an unmarried minor, notifies the parents or guardians of
such minor that such contraceptives or abortion services are being provided."
In order to understand how the FPA relates to constitutional
doctrine pertaining to contraception and abortion, a brief discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court case law in these areas is
necessary.
A.

The Right to Contraceptives

The Supreme Court recognized a married couple's right to use
contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut,26 and a single person's
right to their use in Eisenstadt v. Baird.27 In Griswold the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut statute that prohibited
the use of contraceptives by married couples. Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas stated that the law interfered "with a right
of privacy older than the Bill of Rights."'28 Justice Douglas admitted that this zone of privacy was not specified in the Constitution,
but found the right within the "penumbras" of explicit constitutional guarantees such as the first amendment's right of association, the fourth amendment's recognition of privacy in the home,
and the fifth amendment's guarantee of freedom from selfincrimination. 9
In Eisenstadt the Court used the equal protection clause to
expand the right of privacy announced in Griswold. Although Griswold involved the use of contraceptives by married persons, Eisenstadt overturned a conviction under a state law banning the distribution of contraceptives to single persons. The Court held that
25. S. 1378, § 102(a), 127
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
28. 381 U.S. at 486.
29. Id. at 484.

CONG.

REC. at S6329.
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because Griswold protected the right of married couples to use
contraceptives, the state could not prevent single persons from using contraceptives without violating the equal protection clause. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that "[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."30
Finally, in Carey v. Population Services International,1 the
Court invalidated a New York statute that made it a crime, among
other things, "for any person to sell or distribute any instrument
or article, or any recipe, drug or medicine for the prevention of
contraception to a minor under the age of sixteen years."3 2 The
Court refused to accept the state's proffered interests as compelling. These interests included deterring young people from premarital intercourse, 3 protecting the minor's mental and physical
health, and protecting potential life. 4 Reaffirming its decision in
Griswold, the Court stated that the Constitution protected individual decisions concerning childbearing from unjustified intrusion by
the state,3 5 and went on to note, "the right to privacy in connection
with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to
adults."" With respect to another provision of the statute, which
limited the ability to distribute contraceptives to licensed pharmacists, the Court held that the restriction "clearly imposes a significant burden on the right of the individuals to use contraceptives if
' 87
they choose to do so."
Considered together, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey demonstrate the Supreme Court's recognition of a right to privacy for unmarried minors in the use of contraceptives. Cleary, the assumption underlying the FPA's parental notification requirement is
contrary to the Court's stated policy because this requirement attempts to make the decision to use contraceptives a family matter.
In so doing, parental notification effectively breaches minors' pri30. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
31. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
32. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972), quoted in 431 U.S. at 681 n.1. The
statute also banned contraceptive sales to anyone over the age of 16 unless distributed by a
licensed pharmacist, and prohibited the display or advertisement of contraceptives.
33. 431 U.S. at 694.
34. Id. at 690.
35. Id. at 687.

36. Id. at 693.
37. Id. at 689.
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vacy in deciding that question for themselves. Although section
102(a) ultimately leaves to minors the actual right to decide
whether or not to use contraceptives," it substantially burdens
that right by forcing disclosure to the minors' parents against the
minors' wishes. The intentions of the FPA's sponsors are therefore
clear-burdening minors' exercise of the constitutional right to obtain contraceptives in order to discourage teenage sex. One can expect the FPA sponsors to know that, for many minors, merely confronting their parents with premarital sexual activity will present a
considerable deterrent to seeking contraceptives or contraceptive
counseling. Presumably, the sponsors expect that the limitation of
free contraceptives will increase the fear of pregnancy and curb
teenage sexual activity. This presumption, however, is flawed. A
recent study of teenagers receiving contraceptives from family
planning clinics found that of the twenty-five percent of the minors who would stop applying for prescription contraceptives if
their parents were notified, only two percent said they would stop
sexual activity. 89 The other twenty-three percent would probably
either use less effective over-the-counter contraceptives, or none at
all. The ironic consequence of the FPA's notification requirement,
therefore, is likely to be more unplanned adolescent pregnancies,
and more abortions.
B.

The Right to Abortion

The FPA also imposes potential burdens on the constitutional
right to abortion. In 1973 the Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, 0
recognized the constitutional right of adult women to abortions. 1
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that the right of
privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."'' Although, according
to Blackmun, the right to abortion is not absolute, it is nevertheless a "fundamental" right. Consequently, its regulation can be justified only on the showing of a compelling state interest and
through legislation "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."' 3 The Court found no state interest sufficiently compelling to override a woman's choice to abort before the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

S. 1378, § 102(a), 127 CONG. Rgc. at S6329.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 155.
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third trimester of pregnancy."
In a subsequent decision, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,"'
a five-to-four vote of the Justices extended this right to minors,
invalidating a provision of a Missouri statute46 that required an
unmarried minor to obtain the written consent of a parent as a
prerequisite to obtaining an abortion.47 The Court held that "the
State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third
party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of
the physician and his patient to terminate the [minor's] pregnancy
In arriving at this decision, the Court rejected the state's
claim that the statute protected parental childrearing rights and
strengthened the family unit. 4" The Court reasoned that because

the very existence of the pregnancy had already caused disharmony within the family unit, parental power to veto the abortion
decision would not heal the division.60 The Court concluded that
the parents had no independent interest in the termination of their
minor daughter's pregnancy that outweighed her right to an abortion.6 1 The majority thus shifted the focus of concern away from
the family unit toward the individual minor.
The dissenting Justices" in Danforth agreed with the majority's rejection of the state's proffered interest in protecting parental childrearing rights. The dissenters, however, felt that the state's
interest in promoting the minor's welfare deserved greater attention." They focused on the nature of the abortion decision and the
importance of the state's interest in ensuring that the minor makes
the decision in her best interest. They concluded that a parental
consent requirement is both a traditional and a rational means of
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 163-64.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
1974 Mo. Laws 809.
428 U.S. at 72. The statute required the written consent of one parent during the

first twelve weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion was necessary to preserve the mother's
life.
48. Id. at 74.

49. Id. at 75. The lower court upheld the statute on the basis of this rationale. Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
50. 428 U.S. at 75.

51. Id.
52. Justice White, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined, dissented

from the majority's invalidation of the statute's parental and spousal consent requirements,
ban on saline amniocentesis, and requirement of fetal lifesaving measures. Id. at 92-101.
They concurred, however, in other portions of the Court's opinion. Id. at 101. Justice Stevens dissented separately from the invalidation of the parental consent requirement and the

ban on saline amniocentesis, but concurred with the rest of the Court's decision. Id.
53. Id. at 92-93, 102.
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accomplishing this end.5
5
A qualified parental consent provision in Bellotti v. Baird"
brought the Court closer to the question whether a state could require parental notification of a minor's abortion decision. In Bellotti the Court voided a Massachusetts statute5" that required parental consent. If the consent for an abortion was withheld, the
statute authorized the minor to appeal the parents' decision to a
state judge. In an eight-to-one decision against the Massachusetts
law, the majority held that the minor's right to seek judicial authorization did not go far enough to protect the right of "mature
minors" to make their own abortion decisions.8 7 Four members of
the majority, however, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, described the kinds of state statutes that would pass constitutional
scrutiny."8 The Justices indicated that they would have accepted
the Massachusetts law had it contained sufficient safeguards for
the right of mature minors to make their own decisions at some
point. The other four members of the majority, in a separate opinion written by Justice Stevens, termed this last suggestion of the
Powell opinion merely "advisory." 5 9 It was enough for Justice Stevens that the challenged law effectively subjected the minor's decision to secure an abortion to an "absolute third-party veto" in the
form of either a parental or judicial veto."
Thus, although Bellotti rejected the Massachusetts statute, at
least five members of the Court had taken positions that indicated
potential approval of parental notification requirements. According to the four members of the Court led by Justice Powell, Massachusetts could have constitutionally required a parental consent
stage for all minors seeking abortions as a first step in a process
54. Id. at 95.
55. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
56. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979) provided in pertinent part:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the
consent of both the mother and her parents. . . is required. If one or both of
the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a
judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems
necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the
mother.
d., quoted in 443 U.S. at 625.

57. 443 U.S. at 647.48, 652-56. Justice Powell wrote the Court's opinion, in which the
Chief Justice and Justice Stewart joined. Justice Rehnquist also joined in part, but wrote a
separate opinion. Justice Stevens also concurred in a separate opinion, in which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Justice White filed a separate dissenting opinion.
58. Id. at 643-44, 648-49.
59. Id. at 655-56.
60. Id. at 654-55.
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that eventually recognized the right of mature minors to decide for
themselves whether to have an abortion. Presumably, this fourman group would be likely to accept a requirement of parental notification, as distinguished from parental consent, because notification would have afforded even greater protection for the mature
minor's right than the arrangement the Powell group had indicated
it was willing to accept. When the four votes that joined in the
Powell opinion are added to Justice White's dissent,6 1 the stage is
set for the Court's subsequent approval of a parental notification
requirement., The significance of the Powell opinion was not lost
on Justice Rehnquist. In a separate concurrence, he stated that he
had joined the Powell opinion solely to avoid "a truly fragmented
holding. ' 62 He also stated that he would be "more than willing to
participate" in a reconsideration of Danforth whenever the Court
was willing to do so. a This was a clear signal that the Powell opinion was a step toward weakening the right established in Danforth.
The Court finally weakened Danforth in the 1981 decision of
H.L. v. Matheson," in which the Court sustained a Utah statute
requiring a physician to "notify, if possible, the parents" of a minor upon whom an abortion is to be performed. 66 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger held that "although . . .a state may
not constitutionally legislate a blanket, unreviewable power of parents to veto their daughter's abortion, a statute setting out a 'mere
requirement of parental notice,' does not violate the constitutional
rights of an immature, dependent minor." 66 The Chief Justice
found the law to be justified, because it served "the important considerations of family integrity and protecting adolescents. . .[and
providing] an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical
and other information to a physician."6 7 In his dissent Justice
Marshall argued that the Utah statute unquestionably "infring[ed]
upon the constitutional right to privacy attached to a minor woman's decision to complete or terminate her pregnancy." 8 The
mandatory notice requirement was "not a mere disincentive created by the State, but [was] instead an actual state-imposed obsta61. Id. at 656.
62. Id. at 652.
63. Id.
64. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
65. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1978), quoted in 450 U.S. at 400 (emphasis
omitted).
66. 450 U.S. at 409 (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 411 (footnotes omitted).
68. Id. at 454.
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cle to the exercise of the minor woman's free choice."'

The FPA requirement of parental notification before abortion
service or counseling may be rendered to a minor is consistent with
the Matheson decision, and is subject to the same criticism Marshall directed against the majority in that case-that parental notification weakens the right to abortion by burdening it. But the
FPA goes considerably beyond the Utah statute, for the bill would
burden not only the decision to abort, but also the right to seek
abortion referral and counseling. By requiring parental notification
prior to abortion referral and counseling, the FPA would give parents an opportunity to exert pressure that might prevent the minor
from even acquiring the information she needs to make a reasoned
abortion choice. Moreover, the threat of parental notice at this
early stage may cause some minor women to delay abortion past
the first trimester of pregnancy, after which the health risks significantly increase.7 0 Other pregnant minors may attempt to selfabort or to obtain an illegal abortion rather than risk parental notification.7 1 Many others may forego an abortion and bear an unwanted child, which, given the minor's "probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity . ..
may be exceptionally burdensome."'" These burdens are obviously
intended to deter young women from exercising their constitutional right to safe, legal abortions. Because the FPA's parental
notification requirement takes a big step beyond the Matheson decision, the Court's reasoning in Matheson will not be sufficient to
validate the Act.
III.

THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

As introduced by Senators Laxalt and Jepsen, section 301(b)
69. Id. at 440-41 (footnotes omitted).
70. See Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 548 (D. Me.
1979) (affidavits showing parental notice "may cause an adolescent to delay seeking assistance with her pregnancy, increasing the hazardousness of an abortion should she choose
one."); see also Cates, Adolescent Abortions in the United States, 1 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
CARE 24 (1980).

71. 477 F. Supp. at 548 (affidavits indicating that minor may turn to illegal abortion
rather than have parents notified); see also Kahan, Baker & Freeman, The Effect of Legalized Abortion on Morbidity Resulting from Criminal Abortion, 121 Am.J. OBST. & GmEc.
114 (1975) (illegal abortion rate drops when legal abortions available). The minor may also
seek to abort herself. Alice v. Department of Social Welfare, 55 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 1044, 128
Cal. Rptr. 374, 377 (1976).
72. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 642.
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of the Family Protection Act provides that
[n]o funds authorized under any applicable program or any provision of Federal law shall be used to secure or promote education materials or studies relating to the preparation of education
materials if such materials do not reflect a balance between the
status role of men and women, do not reflect different ways in
which women and men live and do not contribute to the73 American way of life as it has been historically understood.

This section also creates a federal cause of action for "any individual aggrieved by a violation" of the provision. 4 The bill provides
"for damages, or for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, or
both."' 6 Section 301(c)(2) authorizes equitable remedies beyond in-

junctive relief "as may be appropriate to carry out the provisions"
of the FPA's proposed amendments to the General Education Provisions Act. 76 Apparently, federal district courts may establish machinery in the schools for the censorship of textbooks-machinery
analogous to the far-reaching and detailed remedial plans they
have created in school desegregation decisions." Finally, section
301(c)(3) requires expeditious handling of such suits in the federal
district courts. Thus, subsections 301(c)(3)(A) and (B) require the
chief judge "immediately to designate a judge.

. .

to hear and de-

termine the case," to conduct a "hearing at the earliest practicable
date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited."'

8

The bill

would also award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing
7
party. '

These provisions demonstrate that the FPA's sponsors are
seeking to enlist the full authority of the federal judiciary in a national program of textbook censorship for the sake of perpetuating
historical stereotypes. Evidence of an intent to perpetuate sexual
stereotypes exists not only in the Act's explicit reference to the
historical understanding of the "status role" of women, but also in
Senator Jepsen's remarks on the floor of the Senate. In these comments he criticized past governmental attempts to eradicate sexual
73. S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 301(b), 127 CONG. Rzc. S6334 (daily ed. June 17,
1981) (proposed General Education Provisions Act § 440C; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1233h
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (emphasis added).
74. Id. § 301(c)(1).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 301(c)(2).
77. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
78. S. 1378, § 301(c)(3)(A)-(B), 127 CONG. REC. at S6334.
79. Id. § 301(c)(4).
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and racial discrimination. When he introduced the FPA in July
1981, Senator Jepsen stated,
Under title IX funding, human services professionals have
received Federal grants to cure family-related social maladies. A
percentage of these funds are being used to finance 15 race desegregation assistance centers and 10 sex-discrimination assistance centers.
The activities of these federally funded centers range from
recruiting females or males for employment in jobs not traditionally held by members of their sex to identifying race stereotypes in textbooks and other curricular materials and developing
methods of countering their effects upon students.
At best, such design is counterproductive to efforts to treat
each minority as an individual rather than each individual as a
member of a minority.
Mr. President, I ask, Is the role of the Federal Government
to shape the attitudes of the American people? Are we to seek
our moral direction from the Federal Government?8"
From both the wording and legislative history of the Act, it is evident that the FPA encourages sexual stereotyping in textbooks,
manifesting a position directly opposed to the very foundations of
the women's movement-the view that many traditional economic,
political, and social roles exploit women, and that women should
be permitted to assume higher status roles in accordance with their
individual preferences and abilities.
Casual observers of women's issues may not appreciate the impact of sexual stereotyping on young minds. Psychological research, however, has established that textbooks are a major tool in
the socialization of children and have a profound impact on the
development of their personalities.81 Textbooks generally provide
the core of the public school curriculum. Teachers rely on them
heavily. Because they are printed and presented to children in an
authoritative classroom setting, they take on the status of unquestionable truth. Through textbooks school officials, as agents of society, tell children, "This is what we would like you to be." In the
mind of a child, this usually becomes a norm or an ideal to be
achieved.
CONG. REC. at S6327.
81. Child, Potter & Levin, Children's Textbooks and Personality Development: An Exploration in the Social Psychology of Education, 60 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS, No. 279
(1946); Feminists on Children's Media, A Feminist Looks at Children's Books, 96 LIBM. J.
235 (1971).

80. 127
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Scholarly studies in this area have found that sexual stereotypes in textbooks impose behavior patterns upon girls that discourage their aspirations and limit their sense of dignity and auOne report states that "not only are the books a

tonomy.82

powerful influence in stunting a girl's growth but are giving her the
'8 3
subliminal message that she is an inferior, secondary person.
Although the books portray boys as creative, ambitious, independent, and adventurous, they depict girls as helpless, incompetent,
incapable of independent thought and action, and more willing to
give up: "They collapse into tears, they betray secrets; they are
more likely to act upon petty or selfish motives." '
The portrait of adult women in these textbooks fares no bet5
ter.
More often than not, the adult women in these books are
stay-at-home mothers. One writer who reviewed various studies of
the problem summed up the image of adult women in textbooks as
follows: "Mother, generally, is as bland as if she had a prefrontal
lobotomy-an aproned, perennially cheerful cookie baker about to
hand wash a mountain of dishes.""
The occupational outlook for women in textbooks employing
"historical" stereotypes is equally bleak. These books contain
demeaning images of women in both the number and types of jobs
women commonly hold.87 Only rarely do these textbooks show women in occupations other than teacher, mother, secretary, and
nurse. 8 This lack of adult female role models may make choosing a
career difficult for a girl; it may even convey the message that, unlike boys, girls are not supposed to have choices in these matters.
The research of social scientists in this field thus suggests that
the types of textbooks and other educational materials for which
82. See N.

FRAZIER &

M.

SADKER, SEXISM IN SCHOOL AND SOCIETY

WORDS & IMAGES, DICK AND JANE AS VICTIMS:

(1973);

WOMEN ON

SEX STEREOTYPING IN CHILDREN'S READERS

(1972); Stewig & Higgs, Girls Grow up to be Mommies: A Study of Sexism in Children's

Literature,98

J. 236 (1973); U'Ren, The Image of Woman in Textbooks, in WOMAN IN
218 (1971).
83. Note, Teaching Woman Her Place: The Role of Public Education in the Development of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1200 (1973) (quoting WOMEN ON WORDS &
LIaR.

SEXIST SOCIETY

IMAGES, DICK AND JANE AS VICTIMS: SEX STEREOTYPING IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL READERS

6

(1970)).
84. U'Ren, supra note 82, at 223.
85. See Note, supra note 83, at 1201.
86. MacPherson, Challenging the Books That Teach Girls "Their Places," Washington
Post, June 14, 1971, § G, at 1, col. 1.
87. WOMEN ON WORDS & IMAGES, supra note 82, at 6, 48-49, 53.
88. Id. at 53. Even when the books portray women in traditionally "female" occupations, they are not likely to show women acting autonomously.
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the FPA sponsors are calling convey a restrictive and damaging
picture of women that causes girls to have lowered aspirations and
reduced potential.
Is it constitutional for a governmental entity to deliberately
pursue a policy of perpetuating these stereotypes? This general
question embodies two more specific kinds of questions-those
concerning Congress's power to grant or withhold funds, and those
concerning the constitutionality of laws that expressly mandate
sexual stereotyping. Both kinds of questions are present in the typical situation envisioned by the FPA: the dutiful censorship of
textbooks and other educational materials by state agencies followed by the grant of federal funds. Under prevailing precedent,
Congress may indeed be able to withdraw federal funds for the
purchase of uncensored textbooks."' With or without federal funds,
however, states cannot actually mandate sexual stereotyping in
textbooks without offending the equal protection clause.' 0 Thus,
the Constitution may prevent the states from complying with the
FPA and its eligibility requirements for certain federal funds. This
anomalous possibility emerges when one attempts to bring together current judicial doctrine concerning funding and legislative
classifications based on sexual stereotypes.
The FPA's threat to withdraw funds for the purchase of uncensored textbooks bears some similarity to the Hyde Amendment's9 denial of federal Medicaid funds for most abortions. A
sharply divided Court upheld the Hyde Amendment in Harris v.
McRae.2 The Court reasoned that the right to choose an abortion
did not include an entitlement to funding, and that Congress could
therefore grant or refuse funds as it wished, without burdening the
individual's right to choose to have an abortion.' 3 If Congress can
constitutionally refuse funds to those who exercise their right to
have abortions, it may be able to withhold funds from both state
textbook purchases and programs that honor the right to equal
protection of the laws. Arguably, in both cases Congress would not
be denying funds to which anyone has a right. Although a question remains as to whether Congress can condition the receipt of
89. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
90. This article does not address the question whether such a scheme would offend the
first amendment's prohibition against prior censorship. See infra text accompanying notes
107-13.
91. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (amending subchapter XIX of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976 & Supp. H 1978)).
92. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
93. Id. at 316-17.
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federal funds on an agency's willingness to deny equal protection
of the law, a state agency cannot constitutionally deny equal protection of the laws. 4 Our question, therefore, is whether mandated
sexual stereotyping in educational materials would violate the

state's obligation to provide equal protection. The answer appears
to be in the affirmative.
Admittedly, a majority of the Supreme Court has been unwilling to make gender a suspect classification for purposes of equal
protection analysis.15 Race, not gender, is seen as the paradigmatic
suspect classification. When a governmental entity discriminates
on the basis of race, the judiciary will closely scrutinize its action
to ensure the presence of a compelling governmental purpose and
rational basis between the effect of the action in question and its
alleged purpose." When economic and social legislation does not
implicate fundamental rights, the federal judiciary exercises a relaxed level of scrutiny, which amounts to no meaningful review at
all, although in theory some of this legislation could be so totally
lacking in rationality as to warrant judicial condemnation. 7
The Supreme Court has held that gender classifications lie between these two extremes and that these classifications warrant a

"heightened" but nonetheless "intermediate" level of scrutiny. In
what remains the leading precedent in this area, Craig v. Boren,"
Justice Brennan reviewed the controlling principles:
To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish
that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. . . . [Prior cases] have rejected administra94. Nor can Congress take affirmative, direct action (other than the withholding of
funds, perhaps) that denies equal protection of the laws. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). Fourteenth amendment equal protection criteria typically have been applied to federal action under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In Boiling, which was
decided on the same day as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court held
that racial segregation in District of Columbia schools violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. The principle established in Boiling has been extended to the national
government's acts of gender discrimination. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (invalidating federal statutory discrimination between the rights of servicemen and
servicewomen to claim their respective spouses as dependents for purposes of medical and
other benefits).
95. The argument that sex is a suspect classification had been adopted by four members of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
96. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944).
97. For a recent statement of the rational basis standard of review, see New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
98. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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tive ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to
justify gender-based classifications....
[These cases] have invalidated statutes employing gender as
an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classification. . . . Hence, "archaic and overbroad" generalizations concerning the financial position of servicewomen, and working women, could not justify use of a gender line in determining
eligibility for certain governmental entitlements. Similarly, increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the "marketplace and world of
ideas" were rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable
of supporting state statutory schemes that were premised upon
their accuracy. 99
The Court may have deviated slightly from the spirit of Craig
in recent cases that upheld male-only registration for the military
draft 0 0 and state laws that defined statutory rape as a crime that
only males can commit.10 1 But if the Court has, in fact, deviated
from Craig, it has not even begun to weaken that decision to the
point where it would allow mandated programs of sexual stereotyping in textbooks and other educational materials.
This is evident from Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
the all-male draft case, Rostker v. Goldberg.0 3 In upholding the
all-male registration scheme, Justice Rehnquist was careful to review the legislative history of a 1980 congressional decision to exclude women from draft registration. His aim was to show that the
registration scheme was anchored in the permissible purpose of excluding women from combat.01 He concluded that the legislative
history "clearly establishe[d] that the decision to exempt women
from registration was not the 'accidental byproduct of a traditional
way of thinking about women.' "104 In this statement Rehnquist
quoted language from Califano v. Webster,1 05 a case upholding a
provision of the Social Security Act giving women an advantage
over men in computing certain benefits. The per curiam opinion in
Webster upheld the provision as a means of compensating women
for past economic discrimination. The Webster opinion pointedly

stated:
99. Id. at 197-99 (citations omitted).
100. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
101. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
102. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
103. Id. at 75-79.
104. Id. at 74.
105. 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam).
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The more favorable treatment of the female wage earner enacted here was not a result of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about women, or of "the role-typing society has long imposed" upon women, such as casual assumptions that women are
the "weaker sex" or are more likely to be child-rearers or dependents. Rather, "the only discernible purpose of [§ 215's more
favorable treatment is] the permissible one of redressing our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women." 1"
Similar language appears in other cases from Justices who, like
Justice Rehnquist, have opposed strict scrutiny of gender-based
classifications. For example, writing for the Court in 1975, Justice
Blackmun voided a Utah statute making young women ineligible
for child support at an earlier age than their brothers, stating that
we perceive nothing rational in the distinction drawn by [the
statute].. . . This imposes "criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." A child, male or female, is still a child.
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and
the world of ideas. Women's activities and responsibilities are
increasing and expanding. Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity.
The presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is...
desirable ...is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice.
If a specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to
assure him parental support while he attains his education and
training, so, too, is it for the girl. To distinguish between the two
on educational grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not
to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be expected
to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education
to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long
107
imposed.
As long as the Court continues to reaffirm the principle implicit in these passages, it is impossible to see how it could uphold
laws that mandate programs of sexual stereotyping in textbooks
used in public and governmentally supported schools. Even assuming that Congress would be permitted to cut off funds to states and
other entities that refused to stereotype, the states and their agencies could not practice stereotyping in any event. The FPA, therefore, through section 301(b) would force the states into the Hobson's choice of surrendering federal funds or violating the equal
106. Id. at 317 (citations omitted) (brackets in original).
107. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (citations omitted).
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protection clause.
IV.

THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES BEYOND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS

The Family Protection Act poses constitutional problems beyond the more immediate concerns of the women's movement. An
examination of some of these other problems lends credence to a
long-standing claim of the women's movement that opposition to
women's rights is rooted in opposition to constitutional rights in
general. Accordingly, the protection of women's rights is an integral part of a broad civil libertarian commitment.
For example, section 106(b) of the FPA prohibits the use of
any funds of the Legal Services Corporation in any proceeding or
litigation "which seeks to procure an abortion or to compel any
individual or institution to perform an abortion, or assist in the
performance of an abortion, or provide facilities for the performance of an abortion, or to compel State or Federal Government
funding for an abortion." 10 8 Section 106(c) also prohibits Legal
Services funds from being used in any litigation involving divorce
or adjudication of homosexual rights. 109 Finally, section 305 prohibits Legal Services funds from being used in litigation involving
busing solely for the achievement of racial quotas or for the purpose of desegregation. 110 In view of their historical background,
these four provisions manifest a hostility toward constitutional
challenges by the poor against certain federal and state policies.
Yet the right to bring constitutional challenges in the courts is a
right of United States citizenship and essential to the rule of law.
The Supreme Court has stated,
It is said to be the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied guarantees of its Constitution, "to come to the
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that

government, to transact any business he may have with it, to
seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports,
...to the subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the
several States.".
108. S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 106(b), 127 CONG,. REC. S6330 (daily ed. June 17,
1981) (proposed Legal Services Corporation Act § 1007(b)(8); see 42 U.S.C. § 2996f (1976 &
Supp. II 1978)).
109. Id. § 106(c) (proposed Legal Services Corporation Act § 1007(b)(11)-(12)).
110. Id. § 305, 127 CONG. REc. at S6335-36 (proposed Legal Services Corporation Act
§ 1007(b)(9)).
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. . . The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution."'
FPA defenders may point out that these provisions merely extend the rationale of Harris v. McRae'1 2 to other areas. The FPA
provisions do at least that much, but these provisions are potentially more injurious to constitutional rights than Harris. Harris
reached a substantive conclusion about funding; it in no way
sought to obstruct or express hostility to further challenges to its
substantive conclusions. The decision in Harris is as open to continuing attacks in the courts as are any other judicial decisions,
and these attacks may result in an eventual reversal. The provisions of the FPA, on the other hand, not only pursue certain substantive policies about such issues as busing and abortion, but also
seek to discourage constitutional challenges to those substantive
conclusions. By actively discouraging court challenges, the FPA
provisions manifest a sentiment far more hostile to constitutional
rights and institutions than the Harris decision. Writing for the
majority in. that case, Justice Stewart found it necessary to identify
the legislative purpose behind the decision to withhold Medicaid
funds for abortions:
the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth ... is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. By subsidizing the medical expenses of indigent women who carry their pregnancies to term while not
subsidizing the comparable expenses of women who undergo
abortions . .. Congress has established incentives that make
childbirth a more attractive alternative than abortion for persons eligible for Medicaid.11 s
One can wonder how the Court might rationalize the withdrawal of Legal Services funds from those who would test the policies of the FPA. Will the Court be willing to misrepresent the purposes that motivate the FPA? Will the Court state that these
provisions represent a policy of reducing the level of litigation in
federal courts without seeking evidence of such a policy in other
federal legislation? If these provisions are upheld, then one can ex111.
Nevada,
112.
113.

The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) (quoting Crandall v.
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868)).
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Id. at 325.
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pect a misrepresentation of congressional purposes, for it is unlikely that a Court officially committed to constitutional
supremacy would allow Congress to discourage constitutional challenges to its substantive policies and enactments.
Other provisions of the FPA present a clear threat to yet another constitutional right-academic freedom.114 Subsections
301(a) and (b) of the Act provide a cause of action if an educational institution receiving federal funds bars parents from visiting
their children's classroom,1 15 prohibits parents from reviewing textbooks prior to their use in public schools,"' or promotes educational materials that the sponsors of the Act perceive to denigrate
the role of women as it has been historically understood.11 7 These
provisions might be contrasted with the Supreme Court's longstanding opposition to prior censorship' and its more recent opposition to policies "that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom." 1'19
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.. . . The
classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."12 0
The foregoing provisions of the FPA, therefore, hardly jibe with
"that free play of the spirit" that the Supreme Court has said
"teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice." '
Finally, in what is destined to be one of the FPA's most controversial provisions, section 404(a) provides that "[elach individual shall have the right to participate in the free exercise of voluntary prayer or religious meditation in any public building or in any
114. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1965).
115. S. 1378, § 301(a)-(b), 127 CONG. Rc. at S6334 (proposed General Education Provisions Act §§ 440B-440C).
116. Id. § 301(a).
117. Id. § 301(b).
118. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota,
238 U.S. 697 (1931).
119. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 603 (footnotes omitted); see also
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
120. 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) and United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
121. 385 U.S. at 601 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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building which is supported in whole or in part through the expenditure of Federal funds."12 2 Section 405(a) creates a federal cause
of action for "[a]ny individual aggrieved by violation of this title."12 Clearly, this is an attempt on the part of the FPA's sponsors to do indirectly what they cannot do directly according to the
underlying principle articulated by the Supreme Court in Engle v.
Vitale1 24 and Abington School District v. Schempp.'2 Moreover,
this provision conflicts with the Supreme Court's recent action in
Brandon v. Guilderland Board of Education.126 In Brandon a

lower court held that a school board's refusal to permit high school
students to conduct communal prayer meetings on school premises
did not violate the students' first amendment rights to freedom of
religion, speech, or association. The Supreme Court subsequently
12 7
denied certiorari.

V.

CONCLUSION

To opponents and supporters alike, the Family Protection Act
is a sharp departure from prevailing federal policy and constitutional doctrine. Because this is such a radical proposal, one might
expect that time will transform it into something more moderate.
But this has not yet happened. The proposal now before the Senate is a version of a bill proposed by Senator Laxalt in 1979;128 no
moderating trend is evident in the 1981 bill. Aspects of our current political situation make it equally likely that advocates of
these proposals will persist in the years ahead.1 2 ' For example,
122. S. 1378, § 404(a), 127 CONG. Rac. at S6336.
123. Id. § 405(a).
124. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (denominationally neutral prayer offered by the New York
State Board of Regents for use in public schools violated the establishment clause).
125. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (reading of prayers or from the Bible as part of devotional
exercises in public schools violates the establishment clause).
126. 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981).
127. Id. Ironically, § 404(a) also conflicts with a mainstay of conservative constitutional
jurisprudence, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), for the provision assumes that
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, Congress can directly define the right to freedom of
religious expression, without confining itself to the prohibition of state action in violation of
civil rights. For a discussion of the controversy over Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), and Congress's power to enact legislation enforcing constitutional rights, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATnRMLS ON CONsTrruTiONAL LAW 1096-104 (1980). See also Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 603
(1975); Cox, Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 H~Av. L. REv. 91 (1966).
128. S. 1808, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 13,272 (1979).
129. Thus, parts of the present bill have been recently introduced in the Senate as
separate bills. FPA §§ 401-406 have been introduced in the Senate as S. 1577, 97th Cong.,
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President Reagan's Secretary of Health and Human Services has
formally proposed a rule that would require federally funded family planning services to notify the parents of minors receiving oral
contraceptives or prescription birth control devices-a rule that effectively will apply to minor females only. 180 These conservative
proposals could easily generate a debate as acrimonious and divisive as any since the constitutional controversy over the New
Deal's recovery program. For this reason the FPA warrants the
immediate critical attention of constitutional scholars.

1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S9101, S9118-19 (daily ed. July 31, 1981). FPA § 105 has been
introduced in the Senate as S. 1578, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. REc. S9101, S9119-20
(daily ed. July 31, 1981). Several FPA provisions dealing with tax credits have also been
enacted in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 94 Stat. 172.
130. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1982, at 8, col. 1; see also 47 Fed. Reg. 7699-701 (1982).

